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THE LIMITATION
CHESTER

J.

OF LIBERTY

ANTIEAU*

"The principal question in human affairs" is the determination of the
limits of freedom, according to John Staurt Mill,' and others agree to its
prime importance to man and society. 2 Not of recent origin is the search
for principles and tests to determine the extent of the "fundamental freedoms," 3 speech, press, religion and assembly. "For nearly twenty centuries,
the effort of political philosophy in the Christian world has been to
reconcile the dilemna posed by the latent antagonism between Divine
Authority and mundane authorities. ' 4 In 1670 Spinoza felt compelled to
"inquire how far such freedom can and ought to be conceded without
5
danger to the peace of the state or the power of the rulers." After noting
that "in delimiting the field of liberty, courts have professed for the
most part to go about their work empirically," Mr. Justice Cardozo in our
time asserted his conviction "that empirical solutions will be saner and
sounder if in the background of the empiricism there is the study and
the knowledge of what men have thought and written in the anxious
search and grouping for a co-ordinated principle." 6
*

1.
2.

3.

4.
5.
6.

Professor of Law, Detroit University College of Law. Admitted to practice in
Michigan.
Essay on Liberty (1859), (McCallum ed., 1946) 5.
Palmer,
"For Kant the first problem in law was the relation of law to liberty."
"The reconciliation of these opposites
Liberty and Order, 32 A.B.A.J. 731 (1946).
is one of the outstanding problems of the law; it is the problem of liberty and
Cardozo, Paradoxes of Legal Science (1928) 87. "What is the line,
government."
the principle, which marks off those speech activities which are liable to legislative
abridgment from those which, under the Constitution, the legislature is forbidden
to regulate or suppress? Here is the critical question which must be studied, not
only ly the Supreme Court, but by every American who wishes to meet the inMeiklejohn, Free Speech and its
tellectual responsibilities of his citizenship."
35. "There is frank recognition today
Relationship to Self-Government (1949)
that one of the greatest problems of modern governments is the reconciliation of
." Haines,
the liberty of the individual and the interests of the public order ....
Some Phases of the Theory and Practice of Judicial Review of Legislation in
Foreign Countries, 24 Am. Pol. Sc. Rev. 583, 584-5 (1930).
"This court has characterized the freedom of speech and that of the press as
fundamental personal rights and liberties. This phrase is not an empty one and
was not lightly used. It reflects the belief of the framers of the Constitution that
exercise of the rights lies at the foundation of free government by free men. It
stresses, as do many opinions of this court, the importance of preventing the resstriction of enjoyment of these liberties." Roberts, J., for the Court in Schneider v.
New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939). See also: Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
373 (1927) concurring opinion of Brandeies, J.; Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353,
364 (1937); Lovel v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938) ; Grosjean v. American
Press, 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
And note
315 U.S. 568, 570 (1942); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 373 (1947).
the language of the United Nations Charter, Art. I, par. 3.
Morley, The Power in the People (1949) 134.
(Engl.ed., Ratner, titled The Philosophy
Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (1770).
of Spinoza) 55.
The Paradoxes of Legal Science (1928) 96-7. The case to case chaos has provoked
a capable scholar into remarking that "the periphery of liberty, as constitutionally
guaranteed and judicially protected, is enshrouded in a haze of uncertainty."
Swisher, The Growth of Constitutional Power (1946) 182.
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In society not even the "fundamental freedoms" can be absolutes. 7
Notwithstanding adequate evidence that Madison and Jefferson considered
some of the freedoms as absolute, and forceful philsophical arguments
from Schroeder to Meiklejohn, these liberties cannot be treated as absolutes
in a society that considers its survival and treasures others interests. As
Mr. Justice Black has ably said: "No well-ordered society can leave to the
individuals an absolute right to make final decisions, unassailable by the
State, as to everything they will or will not do.'"s The socio-political group's
claim to survival 9 inevitably clashes with and limits the "freedom" to precipitate immediate and violent overthrow of the state. 10 Society's proper
interest in the preservation of life and the avoidance of friction and
12
waste" precludes condonation of those who would falsely shout "Firel"
in the crowded theaters of organized life. Clearly, too, the existence
of one man's freedom must be tempered if freedom is to exist in others.
The totality of freedom is reduced by indulging a religious zealot to play
outside a church recording making impossible the worship of many others
within. Even the foremost contemporary natural rights philosopher, Jacques Maritain, admits that "Freedom to spread ideas which one holds to
be true. . . like freedom of association is subject to the regulations of
positive law." "It is not true," he writes, "that every thought as such...
has the right to be spread about in the community. The latter has the
7.

8.
9.

10.

11.
12.

"The rights with which we are dealing are not absolutes." Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105, 110 (1943).
"Liberty of speech and of the press is also not an
absolute right.... ." Near v. Minnesota, 28a U.S. 697, 708 (1931).
"We, the
democrats, have few absolutes. Even free speech is not so free as to override
the law of libel. He who shouts 'Fire' in a crowded theater goes to jail. Religion
that sanctifies human sacrifice or other kinds of immorality has no constitutional
sanction." Justice William 0. Douglas, Being An American (1948) 190. "The
basic validity of the State's claims to protect the individual and general welfare
against crime, trespass, libel, injury of all sorts to health and morals, as defined
by the community, forbids the easy assumption that there is an unqualified right
of religious liberty against the community and the State." Bates, Religious Liberty
(1946) 301-2. Nevertheless, it is worth recalling Blackstone: "The first and primary
ends of the State are to maintain the personal and civil rights of men." I Comm.
724.
West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 643 (1943) -concurring
opinion.
"In short this freedom does not deprive a state of the primary and essential right
of self-preservation; which so long as human governments endure, they cannot be
denied." Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 668 (1925).
"Government has a right
to survive and powers conferred upon it are not necessarily set at naught by the
express prohibitions of the Bill of Rights." Minersville School District v. Gobitis,
310 U.S. 586, 602 (1940).
". . .as long as human governments endure they cannot
be denied the power of self-preservation." Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 294
(1904).
"The right of self- preservation is an attribute of government." Commonwealth v. Blankenstein, 81 Pa. Super. 340, 342 (1923).
"The Constitution...
does not deprive the State of the primary right of self-preservation." People v.
Most, 64 N.E. 175, 177, 171 N.Y. 423 (1902).
"When the natural liberty (of speech) is adopted by a state, and becomes civil
liberty, those further restrictions are justly added, which are necessary to the
preservation of the state. ... ." Holt, Libel (1st Amer. ed., 1818) 66. "No bourgeois
democracy has in fact ever tolerated the dissemination of opinion hostile to its
fundamental tenets on any scale likely to menace its existence. Car, The Meaning
of Human Rights, United Nations World, Vol. No. 7 (July, 1949) 55.
Cardozo, The Growth of the Law (1924) 140-1.
"The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely
shouting 'Fire!' in a theater and causing a panic." Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47, 52 (1919). Holmes, J.

THE LIMITATIONS

OF LIBERTY

right to resist the propagation of lies or calumnies; to resist those activities
which have as their aim the destruction of the state and of the foundations
of common life." 13
In politically organized societies, such as the United States, which
have institutionalized their greater faith in the judiciary than in the
legslature, the task of delimiting the fundamental freedoms is the function
of the courts. 14 That it is a "delicate and difficult task" is readily admitted by the jurists principally charged with the responsibility.' 5
What factors of determinism suggest to a jurist where he shall draw
the line between freedom and suppression? What principles does he
recognize, what criteria does he utilize, in determining that certain expression is within or without the protective cloak of the Constitution?
The cases eloquently demonstrate, and the psychoanalytical excursions
into the judicial mind verify, that the American judiciary has been influenced in the delimitation of liberty principally by the standards of
history, and by an oft-opposed social utilitarianism posited primarily upon
17
6
the interessenjurisprudenz of Jhering and the pragmatism of Pound.
Nothwithstanding the immense influence of natural rights philosophy
13.
14.

15.

16.
17.

The Rights of Man and Natural Law (1945) 49-50.
"We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say it is,
and the judiciary is the safeguard of our liberty." Charles Evans Hughes, Addresses
and Papers (1908) 139-40. "The Supreme Court is the Constitution." Felix Frank"But we act in these
furter, quoted by Cushman, 23 B.U.L.Rev. 335, 336 (1943).
matters not by authority of our competence but by force of our commissions. We
cannot, because of modest estimates of our competence in such specialties as public
education, withhold the judgment that history authenticates as the function of this
Court when liberty is infringed." West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barette, 319 U.S. 624, 640 (1949), Jackson J. That the judiciary has only recently
been cognizant of its responsibility, note the observation of Schroeder: "I cannot
recall a single case where a statute has been held unconstitutional because in violation of our guaranties of liberty of speech and of the press." Psychologic Study
Interesting historically is the
of Judicial Opinions, 6 Calif. L. Rev. 89, 113 (1918).
now-abandonded rule that permitted juries, as judges of the law, to determine the
constitutionality of legislative enactments. Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law,
52 Harv. L. Rev. 582 (1939).
Schnider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939), Roberts, J. "The task Of translating the majestic generalities of the Bill of Rights. . .into concrete restraints on
officials dealing with the problems of the twentieth century, is one to disturb
self-confidence." West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 639 (1943), Jackson, J. "When the right of society from probable violence
should prevail over the right of an individual to defy opposing opinion, presents a
problem that always tests wisdom..." Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 69 S.Ct. 894
909 (1949), Jackson, J. "To make accommodations between these freedoms and
the exercise of state authority always is delicate." Prince v. Massachusetts, 321, U.S.
158, 165 (1944), Rutledge, J. "A satisfactory adjustment of the conflicting interests
is difficult.... " Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 81 (1949), Reed, J. "A grave
responsibility confronts this Court whenever in the course of litigation it must
Minersville School
reconcile the conflicting claims of liberty and authority."
District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 591 (1940), Frankfurter, J. And note the words
of Fraenkel: "The courts have had great difficulty in deciding where the line
is to be drawn which divides the area of punishable words from the realm of free
speech which is constitutionally protected." Our Civil Liberties (1944) 66.
Der Kampf ums Recht (1872), trans. by Lalov. Der Zweck im Recht (1877), trans.
as Law as Means to an End by Husik.
Interests of Personality, 28 Harv. L. Rev. 445, 453 ff. (1915); A Theory of Social
Interests, Proc. Am. Soc. Soc'y. 16 (1921); A Survey of Social Interests, 57 Harv. L.
Rev. 1 (1943).
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upon the Founding Fathers, it has not patently influenced contemporary
jurists in the instant task. This is not at all because "the pure naturalrights position. . . rules out all communal supervision," as Riesman
asserts,18 but rather because natural rights philosophers regularly admit
that freedom of expression is limitable by positive law, 19 without defining
the situations in which limitation is permissible. This, admittedly, may
not be the responsibility of the philosopher.
Influence of Historial Methodology
Disciples of historical method are wont to define and delimit constitutional freedom by the standards of earlier cultures. Frequent is
their retreat to the common law existing at the time of the adoption of
the United States Constitution. Cooley stated: "We understand liberty
of speech and of the press to imply not only liberty to publish, but complete immunity for the publication, so long as it is not harmful in its
character, when tested by such standards as the law affords. For those
standards we must look to the common-law rules which were in force
force when the constitutionalguarantieswere established."'20 More recently
Burgess wrote of the First Amendment: "We are warranted in assuming
that this restriction could hardly have been intended to prevent the Government of the United States from introducing and administering the law
of slander and libel. The common law never held the freedom of speech
and of the press to be in any measure infringed by this law of slander
21
and libel for the protection of private character."
Courts have frequently utilized historical standards in delimiting the
fundamental freedoms. The United States Supreme Court's determination that freedom of the press prevents pre-publication restraint by the
sovereign wa based primarily upon the antipathy to prior restraints in
Britain and her American colonies. As stated by Chief Justice Hughes for
the Court: "The question is whether a statute authorizing such proceedings in restraint of publication is consistent with the conception of
the liberty of the press as historically conceived and guaranteed." 2 2 Likewise, leaflets and pamphlets were brought within the protection of Constitutional freedom of the press largely because they "have been historic
weapons in the defense of liberty, as the pamphlets of Thomas Paine and
others in our history abundantly attest." 23 And it was chiefly because of
Colonial revulsion to "taxes on knowledge," that the Grosjean tax was
24
held an unconstitutional infringement of freedom of the press.
18.

Riesman, Civil Liberties in a Period of Transition, 3 Public Policy 33, 66 (1942).

19.
20.

Maritain, The Rights of Man and Natural Law (1945) 49-50.
"We are at once . . .turned back
Constitutional Limitations (lst cd., 1868) 422.

21.
22.
23.

extent of the privileges they assure." Id. at 417.
Recent Changes in American Constitutional History
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931).
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938).

24.

Grosjean v. American Press, 297 U.S. 233 (1936).

from these provisions (of the First Amendment, to the common law, in order that
we may ascertain what the rights are which are thus protected, and what is the
(1923)

67.
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More frequently, however, application of historical criteria results
in the denial of Constitutional protection. In 1825 Chief Justice Parker
of Massachusetts sustained a conviction for libel, saying: "Nor does our
constitution and declaration of rights abrogate the common law in this
respect, as some have insisted."' aa According to the New York court of
1902: "The Constitution places no restraint upon the power of the
legislature to punish the publication of matter which is injurious to society
according to the standard of the common law." 26 The typicality of these
statements well justified the observation of Theodore Schroeder in 1918:
"I cannot recall a single case where a statute has been held unconstitutional
because in violation of our guaranties of liberty of speech and of the
press. . . . Under the prevailing 'interpretation' of interpolations of our
Constitutions, freedom of speech and press means just exactly what it meant
in England and in the American Colonies before the American Revolution. The constitutional language has been interpreted in terms of the
Star Chamber, Mansfield, Kenyon and Blackstone, instead of the language
27
of Jefferson."
The denial of constitutional free speech and press protection to
language or literature labelled "obscene" is customarily defended on the
ground that such words were punishable at the common law antedating
our federal and state constitutions. 28 Similarly, refusal to extend free
speech and press safeguards to the utterers of blasphemous and profane
words has been justified with the rationale that the use of such language
was offensive at common law, and that statutes prohibiting their utterance
existed prior to the constitutions. 29 Refusal to cloak the libeller or slanderer with Constitutional protection is traceable to their common law responsibility. Mr. Justice Brown, speaking for the United States Supreme
Court in 1897, said: "The law is perfectly well settled that the first ten
amendments to the Constitution, commonly known as the 'Bill of Rights,'
were not intended to lay down any novel principle of government, but
simply to embody certain guaranties and immunities which we have inherited from our English ancestors, and which had, from time immemorial,
been subject to certain well-recognized exceptions, arising from the necessities of the case. In incorporating these principles into the fundamental
law, there was no intention of disregarding the exceptions, which continued to be recognized as if they had been formally expressed. Thus the
25.
26.
27.
28.

29.

Commonwealth v. Blanding, 3 Pick. 304, 313 (1825).
People v. Most, 64 N.E. 175, 178, 171 N.Y. 423 (1902).
Phychologic Study of Judicial Opinions, 6 Calif. L. Rev. 89, 113 (1918).
State v. Van Wye, 37 S.W. 938, 939 (Mo., 1896); State v. McKee, 46 A. 409, 411,
413-4 (Conn., 1900); Knowles v. United States, 170 Fed. 409, 412 (CA, 8th, 1909);
Williams v. State, 94 So. 882, 883, 130 Miss. 827 (1923) ; Commonwealth v. Isenstadt,
62 N.E. 2d. 840, 848, 318 Mass. 543 (1945). The obsecene language probably was
not a crime at common law, see Kadin, Administrative Censorship, 19 B.U.L. Rev.
533, 536 (1939).
State v. Chandler, 2 Harr. 553, 555 (Del., 1839); People v. Ruggles, 5 Am. Dec.
335, 336, 8 Johns. 290 (N.Y., 1811); State v. Mockus, 113 A. 39, 44, 120 Me. 84, 14
A.L.R. 871 (1921); Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 37 Mass. 206, 214, 217, 218, 221

(1838).
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freedom of speech and of the press does not permit the publication of libels,
blasphemous or indecent articles, or other publications injurious to public
morals or private reputation."' 0
When an accused claimed that freedom of religion exempted him
from statutes outlawing bigamy, the United States Supreme Court measured
this Constitutional freedom by an eighteenth century yardstick. Chief
Justice Waite remarked: "The word 'religion' is not defined in the Constitution. We must go elsewhere, therefore, to ascertain its meaning, and
nowhere more appropriately we think, than to the history of the times in
Mr. Justice Frankfurter
the midst of which the provision was adopted."'3
also indulged in an historical approach in his soon repudiated Gobitis
opinion. In denying claims of religious liberty he said: "In the judicial
enforcement of religious freedom we are concerned with an historic concept. The religious liberty which the Constitution protects has never
excluded legislation of general scope not directed against doctrinal loyalties
of particular sects.' 2 And a plenitude of punishments under the Constitution have been justified 8 ' because Blackstone had the notion that
freedom of the press constituted no deterrent to any subsequent punish4
ment for printing or distributing literature.'
The'techniques of historical methodology have resolved adequately
controversies, not too frequent and not too fighting. Not many, for
example, would contend that freedom of press embraces a right to libel.
Nor is there much dispute as to the propriety of a rule that refusal to care
for the health of one's child is not within freedom of religion. In placing
beyond the pale activities whose claim to the protection of Constitutional
freedom are neither traditionally accepted nor generally acceptable, the
methods of history have on occasion served adequately. Beyond this, however, they are more productive of harm than of good. Note how a great
jurist once strayed through the use of historical standards in this area of
Constitutional freedom. In 1907 Mr. Justice Holmes said that "such constitutional provisions (freedom of speech and press) .. .do not prevent the
subsequent punishment of such as may be deemed contrary to the public
welfare.""5 Fortunately, another twelve years of judicial maturation convinced the Justice of the error of such an approach'to the delimitation
.of freedom, and he enthusiastically repudiated the Patterson aberation
in later years.8 6
30.

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897). See also Caldwell v. Crowell-Collier
Publishing Co., 161 F.2d 333 (CA, 5th, 1947); Commonwealth v. Blanding, 3 Pick.
313, 15 Am. Dec. 214, 218 (Mass., 1825); and Cooley, Constitutional Limitations
(1st ed., 1968) 420.
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162 (1875).
Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594-5 (1940).
e.g. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907).
4 BI. Comm. 150.
Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
Schneck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,
672 (1925) dissenting opinion. Only illustrative of many Supreme Court decisions
utilizing historical measures in the assessment of the place of freedom are: Murdock
v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111 (1943)); "It should be remembered that the
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To measure permissible liberty in contemporary America by the
conditions of pre-Revolutionary England is unthinkable. The religious
test oath and the Star Chamber furnish neither guidance nor inspiration
to a judiciary charged with defining Constitutionally enshrined freedom.
Madison wrote: "The nature of governments, elective and limited, and
responsible in all their branches, may well be supposed to require a greater
freedom of animadversion than might be tolerated by the genius of such a
government as that of Great Britain. . . . Is it not natural and necessary
under such circumstances, that a different degree of freedom in the use
of the press should be contemplated?" 3 7 In 1799 the Committee of the
Virginia House of Delegates on Resolutions regarding the Alien and
Sedition Laws reported, through Mr. Madison: "The state of the press...
under the common law, cannot be. . .the standard of its freedom in the
United States .... The freedom of conscience and of religion are founded
in the same instruments which assert the freedom of the press. It will
never be admitted that the meaning of the former, in the common law of
England, is to limit their meaning in the United States." 38 Schofield
has well said that "One of the objects of the Revolution was to get rid
39
of the English common law on liberty of speech and of the press," and
40
statement.
this
in
acquiesced
readily
has
Court
the United States Supreme
The same Court has emphasized that "No purpose in ratifying the Bill
of Rights was clearer than that of securing for the people of the United
States much greater freedom of religion, expression, assembly and petition
than the people of Great Britain had ever enjoyed." 41 Mr. Justice Holmes
once said: "I wholly disagree with the argument of the Government that
42
the First Amendment left the common law as to seditious libel in force.
Similarly, Professor Chafee has stated: "The First Amendment was
48
written by men.. .who intended to wipe out the common law of sedition."
According to Patterson, too, "The very purpose of the Constitution, and
particularly of these ten amendments, was to secure a greater degree of
personal liberty under the new government." 44 Nor do Colonial bigotries
more desirable charts to contemporary constiand intolerances furnish
45
tutional liberties.

37.
38.
39.
40.

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

pamphlets of Thomas Paine were not distributed free of charge;" and Martin v.
"For centuries it has been a common practice
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, (1943):
in this and other countries for persons not specifically invited to go from home to
home and knock on doors or ring doorbells to communicate ideas."
VI Writing of James Madison (Hunt ed.) 386.
Id. at 387-9.
Freedom of the Press in the United States, 9 Proc. Am. Sociolog. Soc. 76, 87 (1915).
"To assume that English common law in this field is to deny the generally accepted
historical belief that 'one of the objects of the Revolution was to get rid of the
English common law in liberty of speech and of the press.' More specifically, it
is to forget the environment in which the First Amendment was ratified." Bridges
v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 264 (1941).
Id. at 263.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) dissenting opinion.
Freedom of Speech (1920) 23.
Free Speech and a Free Press (1939) 125.
"Religious tolerance was not common in the American colonies." Fraenkel, Our
Civil' Liberties (1944) 51; Meyers, History of Bigotry in the United States (1943);
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In the delimitation of First Amendment freedom recourse to the
context of the Constitution's adoption is of very limited utility. Many
of the Founding Fathers' concepts of liberty were primitive, and their
writings are citable with equal facility for opposite positions on many
questions in this area. 48 The Constitutional debates at Philadelphia cast
no light upon the intent of the men there assembled, and the Hamiltonian
explantion in the Federalist Papers that the bill of right was considered
unnecessary in a government of limited powers47 is now as moot as it
was then unconvincing. We know that the popular clamor for a bill
of rights found representation in resolutions adopted by a number of the
conventions called to ratify the. Constitution, 48 and these resolutions .per49
but nothing in
suaded the first Congress to propose the amendments,
or the
conventions
the
state
by
advanced
amendments
the language of the
Whipple, Our Ancient Liberties (1927); Wright, Religious Liberty under the Constitution of the United States, 27 Va. L. Rev. 75 (1940); Patterson, supra note 42
at 104-112; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (1st ed., 1868) 418.
46. e.g. Jones v. Opelika, 319 U.S. 105 (1943). "The inconclusiveness of the historical
argument is apparent from the cases. In five of the recent major cases involving
interpretation of the First Amendment, the writers of the majority and minority
opinions have both used the historical argument to prove their point. In each of
those cases the argument seemed almost equally adaptable to the disagreeing judges
who arrived at contradictory conclusions. It is submitted that any argument which
is so pliable is of strictly limited utility in deciding cases." Summers, Sources and
Limits of Religious Freedom, 41 Ill. L. Rev. 53, 57 (1946).
47. The Federalists, 84.
48. The ratification of New Hampshire on June 21, 1788 contained the recommendation that there be added an amendment to the effect that "Congress shall make
no laws touching religion, or to infringe the rights of conscience." Elliot's Debates
IV, 215. When New York ratified the Constitution on July 26, 1788, the members
of that convention solemnly declared: "That the people have an equal, natural,
and unalienable right, freely and peaceably to exercise their religion, according to
the dictates of conscience; and that no religious sect or society ought to be favored
.or established by law in preference to others. . . .That the people have a right
peaceably to assemble together for their common good. . . .That the freedom of
the press ought not to be violated or restrained." Elliot, IV, 216-7. Although North
Carolina did not ratify until January 11, 1790, a convention there assembled for
that purpose resolved on August 1, 1788 that a declaration of rights be added to
the Constitution, to state: "That the people have a right peaceably to assemble
for the common good .... That the people have a right to freedom of speech, and
of writing and publishing their sentiments; that the freedom of the press is one of
the greatest bulwarks of liberty, and ought not to be violated. . . .That religion,
or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging it, can
be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force of violence, and therefore
all men have an equal, natural and unalienable right to the free exercise of, religion, according to the dictates of conscience; and that no particular religious sect
or society ought to be favored or established by law in preference to others." Elliot,
III, 212. When Rhode Island ratified on June 16, 1790 it, too, appended a resolution in terms identical with North Carolina. Elliot, IV, 224.
49. At the first session of the First Congress under the Constitution, the following
resolution was adopted: "The conventions of a number of the states, having at
the time of their adopting the constitution, expressed a desire, in order to prevent
misconstruction or abuse of its powers, that further declaratory and restrictive
clauses should be added. And as extending the ground of public confidence in the
government will best insure the beneficent ends of its institutions: Resolved, by
the senate and house of representatives of the United States of America in congress
assembled, two-thirds of both houses concurring, that the following articles be
proposed to the legislatures of the several states, as amendments to the constitu... Elliot, IV, 227-8. As early as October 14, 1774 the
tion of the United States.
Continental Congress had resolved "That they have a right peaceably to assemble.... That they are entitled to life, liberty and property." 1 Journals of Congress
30, Tucker, Constitution of the United States (1899) II, 886.
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proceedings of these conventions indicates the intended scope of the constitutional safeguards desired.
Neither the legislative history of the
Amendment nor the debates of the Congress illuminate the intent of that
body when it proposed the Amendment other than the interesting, but
now academic, point that the Congress refused to accede to Madison's
request for a provision denying to the states power to abridge these
freedoms. 50
James Madison's early reluctance to suggest amendments to the
Constitution was based solely upon his desire not to delay its adoption.
Since he proposed the First Amendment in the Congress and led the fight
for it on the floor of the House, his intent should be interesting. It is
safe to conclude that his biographers are not far wrong in stating that
he envisaged an absolute prohibition upon Congressional legislation restricting expression. Hunt has written of Mr. Madison: "He regarded the
prohibition upon Congress of the First Amendment as absolute, 5 1 and
Burns adds: "Absolute exemption of religion from any degree of political
control was almost an obsession with him. "52 The evidence is overwhelming that he considered the Sedition Act an unconstitutional abridgment
of freedom of speech and of the press. 53 As interesting as is the Madisonian
intent, it is unserviceable, because of its absolutism, in a judicial balancing
of opposed societal interests.
When Mr. Justice Frankfurter states "That there was such legal
liability (for abuse of freedom) was so taken for granted by the framers
of the First Amendment that it was not spelled out," 54 he is almost certainly

in error. The framer of the Amendment, James Madison, entertained no
such notion. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's summary of state constitutions
providing for punishment for abuse of freedom - his proof of the framers'
intent - is accurate enough as of today, but at the time of the framing
of the First Amendment not a single state constitution recognized such
a concept. In fact, the abuse notion did not originate until 1804 when it
was argued to Chancellor Kent's Now York court by Hamilton. 55 Kent
perpetuated the phrase,5 6 but it was not until 1821 that it found its way
into any state constitution. 57 Furthermore, to interpret the First Amendment by the language of state constitutions in existence at the time of
adoption of the First Amendment is a basic error, since the very inadequacy
of the state documents influenced Mr. Madison and his colleagues. On
50.
51.
52.
53.

54,
55.
56.
57.

Annals of the United States Congress, 1st Cong., I, 440-1.
Writings (Hunt ed.) VI, 391.
James Madison, Philosopher of the Constitution (1938) 83.
"In the discussion of the Sedition Law...Mr. Madison maintained its unconstitutionality upon the ground of its being an abridgment of the freedom speech and
of the press." Tucker, Constitution of the United States (1899) II, 669. Writings
(Hunt ed.) VI, 327-30.
Pennekamp v. Florida, 528 U.S. 331, 356 n. 5 (1945) concurring opinion.
People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 337 (1804).
Comm., (Ist ed., 1826) II, 14.
New York Constitution of 1821, Art. VII, Sec. 8, Poore's Federal and State Constitutions, 1847.
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the floor of the First Congress Mr. Madison stated: "Some states have
no bills of rights, there others whose bills of rights are not only defective,
but absolutely improper; instead of securing some in the full extent
which republican principles would require, they limit them too much to
agree with common ideas of liberty."58 And the state constitutions and
bills of rights at the time were too broadly stated and varied too greatly
59
to be of any assistance in interpreting the First Amendment.
Logically, there is no more justification for interpreting freedom of
speech, press, religion and assembly by the norms of 1790 than in limiting
"commerce" to the media of transportation known in 1787.60 To a contemporary judiciary charged with the delimitation of Constitutional freedoms the standards of history are of very limited utility.
Influence of Interessenjurisprudenz and Pragmatism
Inevitably the societal and individual interests 6' in freedom of expression clash on occasion with other social interests. At times freedom has
allegedly imperiled the societal interests in preserving the state,62 in
waging war, 6 3 in fostering respect for the symbols of govenment,6 4 in a
patriotic bar, 65 in an efficient and unpolitical public service,6 6 in protecting
70
69
reputation 67 and property, 68 in safeguarding the public health, peace,
1
order, 7 morality

72

3

7
and purse.

Transplantation of social utilitarianism into the judicial process
has resulted in a characteristic judicial weighing of societal utilties when
determining the limits of freedom. Of America's judicial pragmatists, Mr.
58.
59.
60.
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in 1789. The Constitution was not drawn with such limited vision of time, space
and mechanics." Kovacs v. Cooper, 69 S.Ct. 448, 463 (1949), Rutledge, J., dissenting.
A classic line of Holmes is worth recalling: "It is revolting to have no better
reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.
It is still revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long
since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past." The Path
of the Law, in Collected Legal Papers, 187. Note also Chafee, Free Speech in the
United States (1941) 20.
Pound, Interests of Personality, 28 Harv. L. Rev. 445, 453 (1915).
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
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In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897).
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
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Justice Cardozo was the most expressive.

OF LIBERTY

He readily admitted that here,

as elsewhere, the judicial decision "must depend largely upon the com-

parative importance or value of the social interests that will be thereby
promoted or imparied."7 4 To him "the need is fairly obvious for a balancing of social interests and a choice proportioned to the value .... Involved
at every turn is the equilibration of social interests, moral and economic. .... Back of the answers is a measurement of interests, a balancing
of values, an appeal to the experience and sentiments and moral and
economic judgments of the community, the group, the trade .... Constant
and inevitable, even when half concealed, is the relation between the
legality of the act and its value to society. We are balancing and com'75
promising and adjusting every moment we judge."
Mr. Justice Holmes wrote: "I think that the judges themselves have
failed adequately to recognize their duty of weighing considerations of
social advantage. The duty is inevitable, and the result of the often
proclaimed judicial aversion to deal with such considerations is simply
to leave the very ground and foundation of judgments inarticulate, and
often unconscious."' 76 Categorizing Mr. Justice Holmes with the historical school, 77 largely, one suspects, because of The Common Law of his
comparative youth, is rather ill-advised.
Mr. Justice Stone also saw that the judicial function here, as elsewhere, was a balancing and reconciliation of interests. He stated: "Where
there are competing demands of interests of government and of liberty
under the Constitution, and where the performance of governmental
functions is brought into conflict with specific constitutional restrictions,
there must, when that is possible, be reasonable accommodation between
them so as to preserve the essentials of both, and that it is the function
of the courts to determine whether such accommodation is reasonably
possible." 78

Contemporary high court justices regularly recognize and express
the need for a balancing of interests in the performance of the judicial
function. The clearest revelation in a freedom situation is that of Mr.
Justice Rutledge who wrote: "Where the line shall be placed in a particular application rests. ..on the concrete clash of particular interests and
the community's relative evaluation both of them and how the one will
be affected by the specific restriction, the other by its absence. That
judgment in the first instance is for the legislative body. But in our
system where the line can constitutionally be placed presents a question
74.

75.
76.

77.
78.

The Nature of the Judicial Process (1922)

112.

The Paradoxes of Legal Science (1928) 72-5.
John Dewey said of
The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 467 (1897).
Holmes: "In deprecating the undue share which study of history of the law has
come to play, he says that he looks forward to a time when the part played by
history in the explanation of dogma shall be very small." Quoted by Frankfurter,
Justice Holmes and the Liberal Mind, in Mr. Justice Holmes (1938) 42.
Stone, The Province and Function of Law (1946) 8.
Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 603 (1940) dissenting opinion.
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this Court cannot escape answering independently whatever the legislative
10
judgment, in the light of our constitutional tradition."
Mr. Justice Murphy was writing for the Court in Thornhill v. Alabama
in striking down a statute because it did "not evidence any such care in
balancing those interests (in privacy and the protection of industrial
property) against the interest of the community and that of the individual
in freedom of discussion on matters of public concern.80
That the Court is "faced. . .with the necessity of weighing the conflicting interests" in freedom controversies is evident to Mr. Justice Black.8 '
And he is clear that when constitutional liberties are involved, the scales
are weighted in their favor. "When we balance the constitutional rights
of owners of property against those of the people to enjoy freedom of press
and religion, as we must here," he wrote in Marsh v. Alabama, "we remain
82
mindful that the latter occupy a preferred position1
Mr. Justice Douglas has also recognized that "Courts must balance
the various community interests in passing on the constitutionality of
local regulations," and he, too, adds significantly: "But in that process
they should be mindful to keep the freedom of the First Amendment
in a preferred position."83
In another freedom controversy, Mr.- Justice Reed acknowledged that
"reviewing courts are brought in cases of this type to appraise the comment on a balance between the desirability of free discussion and the
84
necessity for fair adjudication, free from interruption of its processes."
And in the Hatch Act case he recognized that the Court was confronted
with the problem of balancing the "extent of the guarantees of freedom
against a Congressional enactment to protect a democratic society against
the supposed evil of political partisanship by classified employees of
government." 8 5 There is evidence that Mr. Justice Frankfurter recognizes
that the Court is weighing opposed societal interests in determining freedom
controversies.80
Recently, howover, a voice of disagreement has been heard. In his
dissent in the Saia case, Mr. Justice Jackson protested the balancing of
societal interests by his colleagues. "I disagree entirely," he objected,
"with the idea that 'Courts must balance the various community interests
in passing on the constitutonality of local regulations (of freedom of
speech).' It is for the local communities to balance their own interests79.
80.

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
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United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 96 (1947).
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that is politics- and what courts should keep out of. Our only function
is to apply constitutional limitations."8' 7 One wonders what Mr. Justice
Jackson thought he was doing as he applied the clear and present danger
test in the Barnette case. 8 8 How he would determine "constitutional
limitations" remains rather mysterious, and his statement recalls the
89
comment of Holmes.
As great a student of this task as Chafee intimates that "Our problem
of locating the boundary line of free speech is solved" when "courts
realize that the principle on which speech is classified as lawful or unlawful involves the balancing against each other of two very important
social interests," and when judges recognize that "the great interest in
free speech should be sacrificed only when the interest in public safety
We must, however, realize that human interests
is really imperiled ... "90
are not weighed as readily as meats, and we had better remember the
warning of Morris Cohen that the commensurability of human interests
9
is in its infancy and no easy task for sociologist or judge. ' Where a test
is thought to lurk, there is only a technique.
Although most students of the problem join Chafee in affirming the
necessity and desirability of balancing societal interests in the delimitation
of freedom, 92 Meiklejohn has argued that the Constitutional inclusion of
freedom of speech permits no weighing of any interests against the absolute
right "of discussions of public policy." According to him, "the logic of
the plan of self-government, as defined by the Constitution, decisively
' 3
He asserts
rejects the 'balancing' theory which Mr. Chafee advances.'
that "we have measured the dangers and the values of the suppression
of the freedom of public inquiry and debate. And, on the basis of that
measurement, having regard for the public safety, we have decided that
the destruction of freedom is always unwise, that freedom is always expedient."9 4 "When men decide to be self-governed, to take control of
their behavior," he concludes, "the search for truth is not merely one
87.
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of a number of interests which may be 'balanced' on equal terms, against
one another." 95 To Meiklejohn, freedom of "discussions of public policy
. . takes control over all interests."96 He errs, of course, in suggesting
that the present Court balances freedom of discussion on equal terms
with other interests, and he is neither liberal nor cogent in sacrificing
to the will of any temporal majority all religious, economic and philosophic debates.
Judicial balancing of societal interests will endanger the fundamental
freedoms unless the courts remain ever cognizant that the scales are
weighted in favor of expression and the search for truth. Green aptly
remarks: The balancing of social interests. . .has. . .not always been performed as consciously or as carefully as might be desired; it is of course
dangerous unless adequate weight is attached to the freedom." 97 The
First Amendment freedoms will always be endangered if judges deify
themselves as sole oracles of the truth. The mortals on the bench cannot
be permitted to assess constitutionality by the worth they can see in
communications. Constitutional liberties cannot hinge upon the myopia
of a judge.
Furthermore, there are justices who can see a societal contribution
from political discussion, but who cannot perceive the social interest in
the exercise of religious liberty. While this is so, a purported weighing
of societal interests could effect a smaller scope for this freedom than is
commensurate with the Constitutional purpose. Society's interest in freedom of religion is great, and fortunately the perceptive jurist sees not
only the considerable contributions to peace, order and morality that flow
from sanctions the law can never provide, but also the social concern in
dignifying the individual member of society through a full exercise of
his spiritual powers. Mr. Justice Douglas has stated: "Man can never be
only a machine. He has a soul, a personality, a creative capacity. He is
happy only when he has an opportunity to develop the spiritual aspects
of his being. He can achieve happiness only when he is free ....Freedom
of religion and of expression are the keys to spiritual strength of men.
Without them personalities are shrunk and man's fullest development as
a spiritual being is thwarted. '"98 Since the social utility of this freedom
may not be so apparent, jurists in weighing societal interests, must be ever
mindful that when this liberty was enshrined within the Constitution
it was given a weight to be balanced only by a grave and imminent peril
to the very foundations of society. Mr. Justice Frankfurter has well said:
"Because in safeguarding conscience we are dealing with interests so
subtle and so dear, every possible leeway should be given to the claims
of religious faith." 99
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The evaluation and reconciliation of opposed societal interests has
been accomplished most successfully under the clear and present danger
test. 100 Where other tests have encouraged judicial abdication to the
majority will, or encouraged mechanical jurisprudence through the affixation of label, clear and present danger has been a working principle that
implicitly demands a judicial examination of the "substantiality" of the
evil-which is merely another way of saying the importance of the opposed
social interest-and a critical inquiry into the necessity for denial of the
Constitutional freedoms. To rationalize a legislative or administrative
negation of freedom of expression by categorizing the communication as
"abuse" of freedom, or "licentiousness" rather than liberty is something
far less than constitutional adjudication.
The experience of our own nation, as well as those of other nations,
such as Australia and the Philippines, having a system of judicial review
comparable to ours, does not give any assurance that a single test can or
should be applied to the resolution of all controversies involving freedom
of speech, press, religion and assembly. The annulment of legislative
restrictions of freedom because they were unconstitutionally vague and
indefinite, or because they attempted to tax the exercise of a national
right have all been adequate judicial responses to the situation without
utlization of any verbalized criterion. And, judicial weighing of society's
interest in freedom against its interest in preserving the public health
has generally been accomplished rather satisfactorily without use of any
test. Objective tests are quite valueless, and subjective tests will serve their
purpose if they stimulate the judiciary to a conscious, intelligent weighing
of opposed societal interests with due regard for the preferred place of
freedom in our socio-legal hierarchy of values.
100. For analysis of the cases applying the clear and present danger test see articles
by the present author in the April, 1950 Michigan Law Review, and the May, 1950
Univerity of Detroit Law Journal.

